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TAKING HISTORICAL EMBEDDEDNESS SERIOUSLY: THREE
HISTORICAL APPROACHES TO ADVANCE STRATEGY PROCESS
AND PRACTICE RESEARCH
EERO VAARA
Aalto University School of Business, EMLYON Business School, and Lancaster University
JUHA-ANTTI LAMBERG
University of Jyva¨skyla¨
Despite the proliferation of strategy process and practice research, we lack understanding
of the historical embeddedness of strategic processes and practices. In this article we
present three historical approaches with the potential to remedy this deficiency. First,
realist history can contribute to a better understanding of the historical embeddedness of
strategic processes, and comparative historical analysis in particular can explicate the
historical conditions, mechanisms, and causality in strategic processes. Second, in-
terpretive history can add to our knowledge of the historical embeddedness of strategic
practices, and microhistory can specifically help us understand the construction and en-
actment of these practices in historical contexts. Third, poststructuralist history can elu-
cidate the historical embeddedness of strategic discourses, and genealogy in particular
can increase our understanding of the evolution and transformation of strategic dis-
courses and their power effects. Thus, this article demonstrates how, in their specific
ways, historical approaches and methods can add to our understanding of different forms
and variations of strategic processes and practices, the historical construction of organi-
zational strategies, and historically constituted strategic agency.
The very beginning of strategic management
research was closely linked with historical anal-
ysis (Chandler, 1962, 1977), and later landmark
studies were based on longitudinal case studies
(Burgelman, 1983; Pettigrew, 1985). However, it is
fair to say that strategic management research
and business, economic, and social history have
remained largely separate areas of researchwith
few intersections (Ericson, Melin, & Popp, 2015;
Kahl, Silverman, & Cusumano, 2012; Kipping &
U¨sdiken, 2014; Thomas, Wilson, & Leeds, 2013).
Thus, strategic management research, like man-
agement research more generally, has lacked
historical comprehension and sensitivity (Bucheli
& Wadhwani, 2014; Clark & Rowlinson, 2004;
Kieser, 1994; Rowlinson, Hassard, & Decker, 2014;
Zald, 1990). This has hampered our understanding
of key issues, such as the historical embedded-
ness of strategic processes and practices. We
know little about how historical conditions shape
strategic processes or their causal effects, how
strategic practices are linked to their sociohis-
torical contexts and enacted in situ, and how
strategic discourses are products of historical
evolution with implications for what is seen as
important or appropriate in the strategy field and
profession.
Hence, the purpose of this article is to explicate
how historical research can contribute to our un-
derstanding of the historical embeddedness of
strategic processes and practices and our con-
ceptions of them. We focus on strategy process
and practice research that deals with the forms
and dynamics of strategy-making in and around
organizations, including intentional strategic
decision making, planning, or implementation,
and other forms of strategy work processes and
practices. Together with more critical analyses,
strategy process and practice studies have formed
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a vibrant sociologically and organizationally
oriented alternative to conventional perspectives
on strategicmanagement (Floyd,Cornelissen,Wright,
& Delios, 2011; Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006;
Vaara & Whittington, 2012; Whittington, 2007).
However, our understanding of historical embed-
dedness has remained limited in this body of work,
which has constrained its potential to deepen our
graspof thesocial, cultural,andsociopoliticalnature
of strategy-making. While strategy process studies
have emphasized the role of context (Child,
1972; Child & Smith, 1987; Hutzschenreuter &
Kleindienst, 2006; Pettigrew, 1987, 2012), its histori-
cal underpinnings and implications are only par-
tially understood. Although strategy-as-practice
researchers have argued that practices take dif-
ferent forms depending on context, there is a pau-
city of knowledge of the historical construction
of these practices and their enactment in situ
(Ericson et al., 2015; Whittington, Cailluet, &
Yakis-Douglas, 2011). While some critical studies
have examined the historically constructed na-
ture of strategic discourses (Knights & Morgan,
1991; Thomas et al., 2013), there is a need to go
further and examine both the formation and im-
plications of these discourses in various socio-
historical contexts.
Byhistorical embeddedness,wemean theways
in which strategic processes and practices and
our conceptions of them are embedded in and
defined by sociohistorical environments. We ar-
gue for a strong emphasis on historical embed-
dedness: one should not merely place processes
and practices in context but also understand their
inherent historical nature and construction. Thus,
like Kipping and U¨sdiken (2014), in their overall
review of history in management research, we
strive for a “history-in-theory” approach by fo-
cusing on how history can be a key part of our
theoretical understanding of strategy, rather than
serve “merely” as empirical evidence of context.
We propose and elaborate on three approaches
that canbeused toadd toourunderstandingof the
historical embeddedness of strategic processes,
practices, and discourses: realist history, interpre-
tive history, and poststructuralist history. While
there are other ways of distinguishing historical
traditions andmethods (e.g., Rowlinson et al., 2014),
we focus on these three because they provide
distinctively different ontoepistemological alter-
natives for examining the historical embeddedness
of strategic processes, practices, and discourses.
Their philosophical commitments are very different;
they are not merely resources in a historian’s tool-
box but represent fundamentally different ways to
approach and make sense of history.
First, we focus on historical realism, which
can enhance our understanding of the historical
embeddedness of strategic processes. Historical
realism is based on a realist ontoepistemological
understanding of social reality that aims to re-
construct past events and to provide explanations
of historical processes and mechanisms. Histori-
cal case studies have played a key role in strate-
gic process research (Burgelman, 1983, 2002a,b;
Pettigrew, 1973, 1985), thus bringing context-specific
understanding into strategic process research. To
provide an example of a useful but largely un-
tapped method in historical realist analysis, we
point to comparative historical analysis, which
has become an increasingly popular perspec-
tive in economic history and historical sociology
(Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003). Comparative
historical analysis aims at a systematic analysis
and comparison of historical events and pro-
cesses to elucidate patterns and causality in
them (Mahoney, 2003). It can help to identify the
historical conditions, mechanisms, and causa-
tion in strategic processes and, thus, can con-
tribute especially to strategy process research.
Second, we introduce interpretive history
(Collingwood, 1946) as an approach that helps
us understand the historical embeddedness of
strategic practices. Interpretive history em-
phasizes the role of the historian-researcher in
interpreting the importance of historical events
in situ (Collingwood, 1946; White, 1975) and,
by so doing, usually reflects a constructionist
understanding of social reality. In particular,
we focus onmicrohistory as a useful but largely
ignored method in management research
(Magnu´sson & Szija´rto´, 2013). Through the close
analysis of specific events, actions, and prac-
tices, microhistorians seek to identify larger so-
ciohistorical patterns and their characteristics
(Ginzburg, 1993; Peltonen, 2001). We argue that
microhistory can explicate the historical con-
struction and enactment of strategic practices in
context and, thus, canspecificallyadd to strategy-
as-practice research.
Third, we present the poststructuralist histori-
cal approach as a way to increase understanding
of the historical embeddedness of strategic dis-
courses and their implications. Poststructuralist
history is based epistemologically on radical
constructionism and aims at a deconstruction of
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historical conceptions and a critical scrutiny of
generally held assumptions. In this casewe focus
on genealogy (Foucault, 1977) as a methodology
that uncovers and problematizes conventionally
held assumptions of knowledge and their power
effects in strategic discourses. We argue that this
method can elucidate the construction of histori-
cal truths and subjectivities, as well as their im-
plications, and, thus, canaddespecially to critical
studies of strategic management.
Our analysis contributes to theory building in
strategy process and practice research by high-
lighting the historical embeddedness of strategic
processes, practices, and discourses. In particu-
lar, it shows how, in their specific ways, historical
methods can add to our understanding of various
forms of strategic processes andpractices and the
variations in them, the historical construction of
organizational strategies, and historically con-
stituted strategic agency. By so doing, this article
helps to theoretically advance strategy process
and practice research, as well as research on
strategic management more generally. Further-
more, by highlighting the value of specific ap-
proaches and methods, it contributes to the
discussion of new forms of management and
business history (De Jong & Higgins, 2015; Jones
& Zeitlin, 2008; Wadhwani & Bucheli, 2014).
HISTORY IN STRATEGY PROCESS AND
PRACTICE RESEARCH
In recent years we have seen a proliferation of
research that shares an interest in the processes
and practices of strategic management. Such re-
search focuses on strategy-making, by which we
mean all kinds of processes, activities, and prac-
tices involved in strategy formation or imple-
mentation in andaround organizations. This body
of work includes strategic process research and
strategy-as-practice research, as well as more
critical, often discursive analysis of strategic
management. While these streams of research
have distinct roots and characteristics of their
own, they share a sociological and organizational
orientation in their analysis of strategic phe-
nomena. Furthermore, they are increasingly seen
as forming a body of knowledge—as indicated in
recent reviews (Floyd et al., 2011; Vaara &
Whittington, 2012; Whittington, 2007), special is-
sues (Balogun, Jacobs, Jarzabkowski, Mantere, &
Vaara, 2014), or calls for them (e.g., a special issue
on process and practice research in the Strategic
Management Journal).
Strategic Processes
Strategy scholars have focused on the social
and organizational processes through which
strategies have been realized since the 1970s
(Farjoun, 2002; Mintzberg, 1978; Nutt, 1987;
Pettigrew 1973, 1992; Van de Ven & Huber, 1990).
Interestingly, some of these studies—in particu-
lar, Pettigrew’s (1973, 1985) detailed analyses of
decision making and Burgelman’s (1983, 2002a,b)
research on strategy-making—reflect a histori-
cal orientation by virtue of their longitudinal ap-
proach. These studies have shown that strategies
are not always planned or formulated but evolve
from bottom-up initiatives (Burgelman, 1983) or
emergent processes (Mintzberg & Waters, 1982,
1985). According to this view, organizational
members participate in strategy-making through
a myriad of organizational interactions over time
(Bourgeois & Brodwin, 1984; Floyd & Lane, 2000;
Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006; Wooldridge,
Schmid, & Floyd, 2008). Recent contributions have
focused on topics such as autonomous strategy
work (Mirabeau &Maguire, 2013) and temporality
(Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013). Inspired by the re-
vived interest in organizational process studies
(Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, & Van de Ven,
2013), a new streamofmore philosophical process
research has also emerged (Chia & Holt, 2006;
Rasche & Chia, 2009). This work has been closely
linked with strategy-as-practice research and
critical perspectives on strategic management, to
which we turn next.
Context has played an important part in these
studies (for a review see Hutzschenreuter &
Kleindienst, 2006). In particular, Child (1972)
elaborated on outer structuration, Mintzberg
(1977) conceptualized strategy-making as a histor-
ical process, and Pettigrew (1997, 2012) explicated
the outer context. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that
the historical aspects of strategic processes are
only partially understood, and, thus, scholars such
as Pajunen (2005) have called for the use of new
historical methods to promote historical under-
standing in this stream of research.
Strategic Practices
Closely related to strategic process research,
strategy-as-practices research has proliferated
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as scholars’ interest in the detailed activities
and practices of strategy has grown (Golsorkhi,
Rouleau, Seidl, & Vaara, 2015; Jarzabkowski &
Spee, 2009; Johnson, Melin, & Whittington, 2003;
Vaara & Whittington, 2012). In this view, strategy
is seenas situatedactivity that both shapesand is
shaped by its context (Seidl & Whittington, 2014;
Whittington, 2006). This research stream has fo-
cused on the activities and practices engaged in
by managers when they strategize or conduct
strategy work. A part of this stream of research
has explicitly drawn on theories of practice
(Orlikowski, 2000; Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, & von
Savigny, 2001). For instance, Whittington (2006)
and Jarzabkowski (2008) used Giddens’ structura-
tion theory, and Jarzabkowski and Wolf (2015) pro-
vided an overview of how activity theory can be
usedinstrategy-as-practiceresearch.Recentstudies
have also drawn from Foucault (Allard-Poe´si, 2015)
andBourdieu (Gomez,2015), thus linkingstrategy-as-
practice with critical management studies.
In essence, these studies have shown that so-
cial practices, including discursive (Balogun
et al., 2014) but also sociomaterial practices such
as strategy tools (Dameron, Leˆ, & LeBaron, 2015;
Jarzabkowski & Kaplan, 2015; Kaplan, 2011), en-
able and constrain organizational strategy work
(Vaara & Whittington, 2012). By so doing, this re-
search has provided insights into such phenom-
ena as the role and identity of the strategists
(Mantere, 2008) and engagement and participa-
tion (Mantere&Vaara, 2008). Despite these inputs,
this stream of research has also been criticized
for an overly empirical focus and even methodo-
logical individualism (e.g., Carter, Clegg, &
Kornberger, 2008).
Context has played an important role in these
studies in the sense that case analyses and es-
pecially ethnographic methods have gained
ground (Golsorkhi et al., 2015). This has resulted in
a rich understanding of various forms of strategic
practices and strategy-making (Golsorkhi et al.,
2015). However, the historical embeddedness of
strategic practices has remained poorly un-
derstood; despite a few exceptions (Whittington
et al., 2011), history has played a limited role.
Hence, scholars such as Chia and MacKay (2007)
have called for shifting the focus of analysis from
individual strategists to the historically and cul-
turally transmitted fields of practice. Recently,
Ericson et al. (2015) proposed ways to include
history in strategy-as-practice research, includ-
ing microhistory, as we will explain later.
Strategic Discourses
Related to more general interest in critical
management studies is a stream of critical re-
flections explicitly or implicitly linked with strat-
egy process and practice research. These studies
have often drawn from discourse analysis
(Ezzamel & Willmott, 2008, 2010; Grandy & Mills,
2004; Vaara, 2010). In particular, Knights and
Morgan’s (1991) genealogical analysis of strate-
gic management has served as a landmark for
critical strategy studies aswell as processual and
practice-based work on discourse, as shown, for
example, in the recent special issue by Balogun
et al. (2014) in the Journal of Management Studies.
There is also more recent critical work focusing
on the role of history in strategy, and a special
issue of Business History (Carter, 2013) provides
examples of how to conduct critically oriented
historical strategy research. This includes papers
by Kornberger (2013) and Thomas et al. (2013),
which we will return to later.
In all, strategy process and practice research
has offered an alternative to the performance-
oriented mainstream strategy research by bring-
ing in sociological and organizational insights.
These studies have emphasized the role of
context in various ways. However, with few ex-
ceptions, the historical nature and construction
of strategic processes and practices have re-
ceived little attention (Carter, 2013; Ericson et al.,
2015; Whittington et al., 2011). While longitudi-
nal analysis of processes and detailedmicrolevel
study of practices in context may be seen as
characteristics of a historical interest, the fact
remains that we know little of the historical
embeddedness of strategic processes and prac-
tices. Moreover, although the more critical ana-
lyses have introduced insights into the historical
construction of strategic discourses, thiswork has
remained limited in its scope. This lack of un-
derstanding of historical embeddedness is a de-
ficiency per se, and it has also kept this body of
work from achieving its full potential with respect
to the theoretical understanding of strategic pro-
cesses and practices and our conceptions of them.
THREE APPROACHES TO
HISTORICAL EMBEDDEDNESS
In this section we elaborate on three ontoepis-
temologically and methodologically different
approaches that can advance our understanding
636 OctoberAcademy of Management Review
of the historical embeddedness of strategic pro-
cesses, practices, and discourses: realist history, in-
terpretive history, and poststructuralist history. Our
reasons for focusingon these threeare twofold. First,
we wish to present distinct ontoepistemological
and methodological alternatives that historical
research, not limited to business history, pro-
vides for elucidating the embeddedness of stra-
tegic processes, practices, and discourses. As has
been called for, we highlight fruitful intersections
rather than offer a comprehensive account of a full
range of historical methods (Bucheli &Wadhwani,
2014; Jones & Zeitlin, 2008; Rowlinson et al.,
2014).
Second,wewish to do this in away that coheres
with the ontoepistemological and methodologi-
cal discussion in management and organization
studies (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Hassard & Cox,
2013;Newton,Deetz, &Reed, 2011). For example, in
the paradigm model of Hassard and Cox (2013),
realist history resonates with structuralism, in-
terpretive history with antistructuralism, and
poststructuralist history with poststructuralism.
Presenting and elaborating on distinct ap-
proaches is important for advancing a multifac-
eted understanding of historical embeddedness
that does justice to the alternative epistemologi-
cal and methodological understandings of orga-
nizational phenomena—in our case, processes,
practices, anddiscourses. Table 1 summarizes the
characteristic features of the three approaches.
Historical Realism and Embeddedness of
Strategic Processes
Ontoepistemological basis. Historical realism
in general and realist case studies and com-
parative historical analysis in particular can
advance our understanding of the historical
embeddedness of strategic processes. Historical
realism is an umbrella concept for analyses
that aim to reconstruct past events by using his-
torical sources. Hence, historical realism may
include several perspectives and methods of
historical analysis. Ontoepistemologically, his-
torical realism means accurate and authentic
reconstruction of events and processes from the
perspective of an external observer (Steinmetz,
1998). For example, Kuzminski saw realism as
“descriptive accounts [as] self-validating; that
is, that their truth-value is manifest in the face
of appropriate evidence” (1979: 329). This is the
approach often taken in traditional corporate
histories (Ericson et al., 2015; Rowlinson et al.,
2014).
Historical realism can also involve an attempt to
go beyond this “surface,” as in a transcendental
understanding of history and social reality. This re-
flects the philosophical foundations of scientific re-
alism (Bhaskar, 1975; Reed, 2005) in that it focuses
attentiononstructures,processes,andmechanisms.
This is often the case in historical sociology and
economic history and is close to what Rowlinson
et al. call analytically structured business history:
Analytically structured history thus uses analytic
constructs—such as “strategy” and “structure”—to
search archival sources, enabling the construction of
a narrative of structures and events that may not
even have been perceived as such by actors at the
time. Hence, although analytically structured history
retainsnarrativeas themainformofexplanation, it is
driven by concepts, events, and causation (2014: 264).
Arguably, most existing historical strategy re-
search follows a realist approach (Ingram, Rao, &
Silverman, 2012; Kipping & Cailluet, 2010).
Methodology.Realist history is often conducted
in the form of historical case studies that focus on
processes, structures, and patterns that are as-
sumed to exist independently of the researcher’s
imagination (Kuzminski, 1979; Steinmetz, 1998).
Management research and especially business
historyprovidenumerousexamplesofsuchstudies.
Ericson et al. put it as follows:
The emergent discipline of business history is
closely related to the development of the case
method, according to which strategy is framed as
something made through isolated moments of in-
tentional decision-making that provide a critical
turning point in a chronological narrative flow of
events. The narrative leads up to the moment of
a strategic decision, ushering in the future, shaped
by the strategic decision taken (2015: 507).
For our purposes, it is important to note that sev-
eral landmark strategy process studies are essen-
tially realist historical case studies. Pettigrew’s
(1973) work on the politics of organizational de-
cisionmakingprovidesanearly exemplary study in
which the historical detail is remarkable. His long-
termwork on continuity and change in ICI provides
another exemplary study (Pettigrew, 1985). These
studies have paved theway for theoretical analysis
of contextandembeddedness (Pettigrew,1987, 2012).
Pettigrew (1997) also has reflected on how to
conduct (historically oriented) process studies.
Burgelman (1983, 1994, 2002a,b) offers another key
2016 637Vaara and Lamberg
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example in his long-term work on Intel. His
analysis highlights the dynamics of emergent
strategy or autonomous strategy work as embed-
ded in specific historical contexts. In particular,
Burgelman (2002b) provides an illuminating lon-
gitudinal case study comparing Intel’s strategy-
making under Andy Grove’s leadership with the
characteristics of the previous period. Based on
a combination of interviews and historical study
of corporate documents, the analysis details
the differences in strategy-making in these time
periods and also describes their linkages with
the overall organizational and technological
changes.On this basis, theanalysis explains how
Intel’s strategy moved away from the “internal
ecology” model and toward the “rational actor”
model. It also elucidates how the positive envi-
ronmental feedback associated with the new
strategic orientation created a coevolutionary
lock-in that hadamajor impact ondevelopment of
the corporation. Burgelman’s (2011) later work
also offers explicit reflections on the merits and
challenges of longitudinal case studies, calling
for deeper historical reflection and more system-
atic processual analysis.
Furthermore, there are some explicitly histori-
cal case studies illuminating the dynamics of
strategic processes (Kipping & Cailluet, 2010;
Rowlinson, 1995). In particular, Kipping and
Cailluet (2010) examined the interplay of de-
liberate versus emergent strategy-making at
Alcan between 1928 and 2007. Their analysis
shows how the company gradually moved from
emergent to more deliberate strategy-making,
although external forces continued to influence
its decisions. Such historical case studies can
thus be used to explicate the dynamics of strate-
gic processes, especially their contextual
embeddedness (Pettigrew, 1987, 1992). They also
exemplify the importance of long-term historical
analysis—often based on years of engagement—
and authenticity in such studies.
There are, however, other historical methods,
such as comparative historical analysis, that can
help us to go further in the analysis of historical
embeddedness. Comparative historical analysis
has developed, in recent years, into a vibrant
analytical methodology in history and historical
sociology (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003). In
essence, this method takes realist historical case
studies further in its more systematic causal
analysis and comparison. According to Mahoney
andRueschemeyer, the three identifying issues of
historical comparative research are causal re-
lationships, processes over time, and compari-
sons. As they put it:
Comparative historical inquiry is . . . concerned
with explanation and the identification of causal
configurations that produce major outcomes of in-
terest, . . . analyze historical sequences and take
seriously the unfolding of processes over time . . .
[and] engage in systematic and contextualized
comparisons of similar and contrasting cases
(Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003: 48).
Despite its potential, comparative historical
analysis has not yet been fully applied in strategy
process research. Pajunen (2005), nevertheless,
provides an illuminating reflection and example
ofwhat that could entail. He underscores the need
to examine strategic actions and decisions sys-
tematically to be able to comprehend their stra-
tegic impact. This involves comparison across
cases to be able to distinguish more general pat-
terns from case-specific idiosyncratic features.
This should then lead to an elaboration of the key
causal mechanisms at play in these strategic
processes. Pajunenapplies it to ananalysis of two
decline and turnaround cases in the paper and
pulp sector in Finland. Based on a detailed his-
torical analysis of key events, he establishes un-
derstanding of “event causality”—that is, how
specific strategic decisions and actions influ-
enced the course of events—and then compares
the cases. On this basis he proposes that in the
context of decline, strategic processes involve
several causal mechanisms related to signals of
poor performance and external reactions.
While almost nonexistent in strategy process
research, there are, however, examples of com-
parative historical analysis in adjacent fields
(Finkelstein, 2006; Lamberg, Na¨si, Ojala, &
Sajasalo, 2006; Murmann, 2013). In particular,
Murmann’s (2013) study of industrial coevolution
illuminates the potential of comparative his-
torical analysis. His analysis focuses on the de-
velopment of the synthetic dye industry over
a sixty-year period. Based on a vast amount of
systematically collected historical material, the
analysis focuses on how the interactions between
the organization and the research community
steered the development of the synthetic dye in-
dustry and the companies involved. Essential in
the analysis is the condensing of the empirical
material into key events and actions and their
subsequent comparison across several company
cases in five countries. As a result, Murmann
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identifies three causal mechanisms—exchange
of personnel, commercial ties, and lobbying—in
determining the coevolutionary trajectory. While
the study does not focus on strategy-making, it
illuminates how these interactions influenced the
strategicdecisions of the companies involvedand
reveals differences across the companies and
countries studied.
Contribution: Historical embeddedness of
strategic processes. Realist historical research in
general and comparative historical analysis in
particular can advance our understanding of the
historical embeddedness of strategic processes
and therefore contribute to research on the role of
context in strategy process studies (Child, 1972;
Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006; Pettigrew,
1987). First, comparative historical analysis can
highlight the characteristic features of strategic
planning and other forms of strategy-making
across contexts. Sociohistorical or cultural differ-
ences in strategic processes have not generated
a great deal of interest in strategy process re-
search, despite calls for analysis of context and
embeddedness (Floyd et al., 2011; Hutzschenreuter
& Kleindienst, 2006; Pettigrew, 1997, 2012). A com-
parative historical perspective can significantly
broaden the research agenda in this respect. Such
analysis involves not only an identification of the
general social or organizational dynamics of stra-
tegic processes but an inherent interest in the dif-
ferences and variations of these processes across
historical time periods and contexts. This type of
analysis can focusattentiononprocesses thathave
not been labeled as “strategic” and can thus ex-
pand our understanding of the forms and varia-
tions in strategy-making. This can involve analysis
of strategic processes in contexts that have not
been characterized by strategic planning as we
nowadays tend to see it. For instance, studies of
strategy-making before the 1960s are likely to re-
veal significant differences from those following
the spread of strategic planning since the 1960s.
Strategic processesalsoappear to be verydifferent
in nature when one compares those in the Ameri-
can or British institutional and cultural contexts,
which we know most about, with those in other
places inEuropeor inAsia indifferent timeperiods.
This is also the case with different sociopolitical
contexts that have received little attention in
strategy research; for instance, one could compare
strategic planning processes in the West with
those in the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War or
with those of American, Chinese, and Japanese
corporations in various time periods. In addition
to highlighting overall differences, such analysis
could focus on specific issues, such as the relative
importance of top-down formal versus autono-
mous strategy work (Kipping & Cailluet, 2010;
Mirabeau & Maguire, 2013) in different sociohis-
torical contexts.
Second, such analysis can contribute to a better
understanding of historical conditions as triggers
and determinants of strategic processes. Strate-
gic processes, involving more formal, planned, or
top-down and especially emergent processes, of-
ten result from environmental changes. This is
evident in the historical case studies referred to
above. For example, Burgelman’s studies on
Intel’s history reveal that the emphasis on an au-
tonomous (1994) or induced (2002a) mode of strat-
egizing depended on the interplay between the
competitive environment and the corporation’s
actions, aswell as on the actions of the executives
in charge. Comparative historical analysis can
further elucidate the interconnectedness of corpo-
rate strategicprocesseswith thebroaderhistorical
development of the industry and thus contribute to
our understanding of the evolution of strategic
processes—which is one of the key issues in
strategy process research (Hutzschenreuter &
Kleindienst, 2006). Like Murmann’s (2013) study,
such historical analysis may capture long pro-
cess cycles with a beginning and end, therefore
enabling systematic identification and com-
parison of the dynamics of strategic processes.
This is essential for understanding such phe-
nomena as path dependency or coevolution or
for assessing the outcomes of strategic processes.
In particular, careful causal analysis of key
events and patterns can clarify the extent to
which corporate strategy-making reflects the
more general trends or changes in the environ-
ment (e.g., technological or sociopolitical changes)
or the extent to which corporate strategy-making
may create truly novel strategic ideas and trigger
newdevelopments. Hence, such analysis can help
to identify turning points in strategy-making and
relate them to broader field-configuring events
and processes.
Third, comparative historical analysis can also
elucidate the “embedded agency” of the strategic
actors involved, which is yet another key issue in
strategy process studies (Floyd et al., 2011: 941). By
embedded agency, we mean the historical and
contextual influence exercised by top executives
or others in order to impact the strategies of the
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organization (Lamberg & Pajunen, 2010). This key
issue in strategy process research has not re-
ceived the attention it deserves, at least in part
because of a lack of conceptual and methodolog-
ical tools for contextualization. Pettigrew’s (1987,
2012) and Burgelman’s (1983, 2002a) studies high-
light topmanagerial agency in key turning points
of corporate evolution, and more recent process
studies elaborate on the dynamics related to this
agency (Denis, Dompierre, Langley, & Rouleau,
2011; Mirabeau & Maguire, 2013). Comparative
historical analysis provides additional means to
elucidate suchagency inanexplicitmanner, as in
the systematic examination of key decisions, ac-
tions, and their consequences in Pajunen (2005) or
Murmann (2013). This can also involve explicit
counterfactual reasoning—that is, analysis of
whatwouldhavehappenedhad the topmanagers
or other actors not acted the way they did
(Ferguson, 1997; Tetlock & Belkin, 1996). Although
such counterfactual analysis can take many
forms, it must be systematic and explicit (Durand
& Vaara, 2009).1 Thus, comparative historical
analysis of managers’ actions, decisions, and
choices can improve our understanding of the
extent towhich theywere indeed “strategic” in the
course of the historical evolution of an industry,
economy, or society.
Interpretive History and Embeddedness of
Strategic Practices
Ontoepistemological basis. The interpretive
approach in general and microhistory in particu-
lar can advance our understanding of the histor-
ical embeddedness of strategic practices by
placing strategic actions and associated prac-
tices in their historical context. Interpretive his-
tory is abroad concept referring to studies that are
based on an intensive qualitative examination of
historical sources, with a focus on understanding
the meaning of the events in question (Carr, 1986;
Iggers, 2005). Collingwood’s (1946) famous con-
cept of “reenactment” literally means thinking
through the thoughts of past actors. As he ex-
plains it, the historian’s
work may begin by discovering the outside of an
event, but it can never end there; he must always
remember that theeventwasanaction, and thathis
main task is to think himself into the action, to
discern the thought of its agent (Collingwood, 1946:
142).
Ontoepistemologically, interpretive historymay
reflect several kinds of positions (see, for example,
Kuzminski, 1979, and White, 1975). However, it is
usually based on some kind of social construc-
tionist or hermeneutic understanding of history.
On the one hand, the focus is on the meaning of
specific events or actions for the actors involved.
This makes interpretive history an approach that
resonates with studies of strategic practices in
context. On the other hand, interpretive history
involves awareness of the researcher’s con-
structions of episodes and historical narratives
(Ankersmit, 2013). For example, White (1975) saw
all historical research as narrated and depen-
dent on the writer’s embeddedness in his or her
social and intellectual context.
Methodology. Interpretive history is pursued
across several fields of contemporary history re-
searchbut isparticularlywidespread insocialand
cultural historywhere, in general, scholars seek to
understand the meaning of actions in context. The
key methodological characteristic of interpretive
historical work is the aim to arrive at an empa-
thetic understanding of the actions of individuals
and the meanings of these actions when contex-
tualized in a specific setting. While interpretive
history may take different forms, we focus in the
followingonmicrohistory asaparticularly fruitful
method to better understand the historical
embeddedness of strategic practices.
Microhistorians aim to elucidate historical
patterns and social structures (Ginzburg, 1993;
Peltonen, 2001) through the close analysis of spe-
cific events, actions, or practices. This has been
done in a variety of ways in, for example, histori-
cal microanalysis (Stewart, 1959) or cultural his-
tory (Ginzburg, 1993). Although the term micro
implies an empirical focus on detail, micro-
historians emphasize that they are interested in
“big” issues. Joyner famously stated that micro-
historians need to ask “large questions in small
places” (1999). Magnu´ssen and Szija´rto´ explain
the essence of contemporary microhistory as
follows:
Microhistory . . . pursues the idea that a small unit
can reflect a larger whole. . . . in the most suc-
cessful instances the microhistorian’s subject is
1 Durand and Vaara (2009) provide a template that can be
useful in systematic counterfactual analysis in strategy stud-
ies. The stages in their model include the identification of
critical events, specification of causal processes and mecha-
nisms, and the use of counterfactuals to establish causation.
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deconstructed within its own framework; a large
range of factors that relate to the subject are ex-
amined and analysed (2013: 327).
Microhistory can thus focus on the everyday triv-
ialities, anomalies, and grassroots processes to
reveal long-term social dynamics and struc-
tures in which the local and temporal activities
and practices are embedded (Peltonen, 2001). It
is characteristically based on ethnographic-type
data—observation or historical materials re-
vealing authentic experiences—and, thus, what
Rowlinson et al. (2014) label ethnographic history.
Microhistory may take various forms, ranging
from intensive synthesis of rich historical data to
interpretation of specific instances of historical
information. For instance, Stewart’s (1959) classic
analysis of the Battle of Gettysburg (Pickett’s
Charge: A Microhistory of the Final Attack at
Gettysburg, July 3, 1863) is an early inspirational
example of how specific decisions and actions at
a particular point in time help to explain the big-
ger picture. The book literally focuses on one
day of fighting during the U.S. Civil War, and,
by analogy, it exemplifies the opportunities and
challenges of the microhistorical approach for
strategy research. The book consists of descrip-
tion and analysis of the actions of General Lee
and his Confederate army at Gettysburg.
This book is an example of microhistorical
workmanship in many respects. It is based on
extensive material, including oral history ac-
counts, memoirs, diaries, correspondence, and
published research. The amount of material al-
lows a detailed, minute-by-minute description of
the microactions during the day but also embeds
thesemicroactions in the larger context of thewar,
as well as the cultural contexts that are reflected
in the values and shared understandings of the
rules of the game. The book thus provides a thick
description of strategizing and its contextual
embeddedness. In particular, it describes in de-
tail howgeneralswereunawareof themoraleand
physical condition of the troops, how brigadiers
did not foresee the actions of neighboring regi-
ments, and how most of them were misinformed
about the enemy’s strengths and operational
capabilities.
The more culturalist tradition in microhistory
has, in turn, emphasized the historian’s con-
structions of events and actions. In their classic
works, Ginzburg’s (1993) and Levi’s (1991) starting
pointwasa collection ofmaterial that allowed the
microscopic scrutiny of particular processes in
a distant past. In this view, the aims of the
microhistorical movement are not only methodo-
logical but also theoretical and political, as
summarized inGregory’s influential book review:
By dramatically shrinking the arena of investiga-
tion, the practitioners of Alltagsgeschichte [the
German version of microhistory] and microstoria
[the Italian version] questioned the purported
teleology of modernizing historical processes.
Their diverse, detailed results suggest that de-
velopments such as industrialization and bureau-
cratization should be rethought as contingent and
uneven. At the same time, meticulous attention to
human interaction on the micro-scale preserves
the agency of ordinary people. Reversing the views
of social historians who saw teleology “on their
side,” this vision suggests hope for an undeter-
mined future insofar as it finds contingency in the
past (1999: 101).
Microhistorical analyses of strategic practices
have, however, been lacking. In a rare exception,
Ericson et al. argue that their “focus onmicro-scale
moments and events” suggests “an obvious af-
finity with the interest of strategy as practice in
the quotidian” (2015: 511). They also exemplify
microhistory’s method and potential with refer-
ence to Popp and Holt’s study (2013) of leadership
succession strategy atWedgwoodandSons in the
late eighteenth century. Interestingly, the whole
study isbasedona letterwrittenby founder Josiah
Wedgwood to his son Josiah II reflecting on the
succession of the business. The analysis focuses
on the content of the letter, while at the same time
contextualizing it, to illuminate the specificities of
the historical context with its different layers.
Hence, this study exemplifies how microhistories
can be constructed on the basis of seemingly
small pieces of empirical data.
Microhistory may, however, also be based on
larger sets of empirical material that are used in
condensed presentations of microlevel activities
and practices. This is the case with recent busi-
ness histories that reflect amicrohistorical way of
presenting the actions of the key persons in con-
text. For instance, Stiles’ (2009) biography of Cor-
nelius Vanderbilt provides a thick description of
the strategizing of the “first tycoon” in historical
context. In particular, the book provides several
microhistorical illustrations of strategy-making
that reveal how Vanderbilt was both enabled and
constrained by the prevailing industrial and or-
ganizational practices. Furthermore, these in-
stances illuminate how Vanderbilt at times broke
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the rules of the game and established new stra-
tegicpractices. Thus, Stiles’ study isaparticularly
interesting example of the opportunities of the
microhistorical approach since it exemplifies
how the practices of competitive strategy may
be studied as part of a multifaceted historical
analysis.
Simon’s (2011) business history of the Finland-
based KONE Corporation, in turn, elaborates on
the practices of strategy-making in another cul-
tural historical context: that of the Cold War. The
book starts with an illuminating example of de-
cision making about an unprecedented acquisi-
tion by the Finnish company in Sweden. This
microhistorical episode is described and ana-
lyzed in depth, and it highlights how the key de-
cision makers were operating in a very specific
environment constituted by Cold War Finland
and its political decision-making practices and
the traditions of the family business. The analysis
in particular illuminates how the roles and
identities of the actors were linked with these
practices.
Contribution: Historical embeddedness of
strategic practices. Interpretive historical re-
search in general and microhistory in particular
can add to our understanding of the historical
embeddedness of strategic practices and thus
contribute especially to strategy-as-practice re-
search. First, microhistory can help us better
comprehend the historical nature of strategic
practices. This can add to our understanding of
what is general or typical in strategicpractices in
particular historical settings. Following the tra-
dition of research on social practices, strategy-
as-practice research has focused on both the
apparent and deeper-level practices and their
implications. While these studies have placed
practices in context, they have rarely elaborated
on the historical aspects of them (Vaara &
Whittington, 2012; Whittington et al., 2011). It is,
however, important to highlight themultifaceted
nature of these practices and compare how prac-
tices may differ from one historical time period
and sociocultural context to another. For example,
strategic planning had been practiced long be-
fore the label “strategic planning” became wide-
spread (Whittington et al., 2011). Similarly, the
ways in which managers strategize have cer-
tainly changed over time; compare, for example,
decision making in the early 1900s with the
post-WWII or Cold War eras or the distributed
work practices offered by the new technologies in
contemporary organizations. In future research it
would be interesting not only to focus on the most
apparent practices but also to examine contro-
versial or “illegitimate” practices, including, for
example, empire building, genderdiscrimination,
or nepotism, and how they are defined across so-
ciohistorical contexts as exemplified by Stiles
(2009) or Simon (2011). By “zooming in and out,”
microhistory can add to our understanding of
forms of strategic practices and uncover “layers”
of embeddedness.
Second, microhistory explicates the actions of
managers and how they make sense of strategic
issues in specific sociohistorical settings. Hence,
it can highlight how strategic practices are
enacted or how actors make use of them in con-
crete instances of strategizing or strategy work.
This can involve close analysis of episodes of
strategy-making work, as in Stiles (2009) or Simon
(2011). This kind of analysis helps to place par-
ticular events or episodes in their wider social,
cultural, and sociopolitical contexts and, thus,
extend the scope of strategy-as-practice research.
For instance, although strategy meetings and
workshops have received special attention in
strategy-as-practice research (Jarzabkowski &
Seidl, 2008; Johnson, Prashantham, Floyd, &
Bourque, 2010), we do not know how such meet-
ings and workshops and their functions or rituals
have changed over time, and thus do not fully
comprehendtheways inwhichmanagersandother
organizational members are enabled or con-
strained by the practices of particular settings.
Furthermore, microhistorical analysis can eluci-
date the use of strategy tools in context (Dameron
et al., 2015; Jarzabkowski & Kaplan, 2015; Kaplan,
2011). For instance, Kaplan (2011) has demon-
strated the central role of PowerPoint in strategy-
making, in that it focuses attention on specific
issues and not others and favors specific actors
and not others. However, various tools and tech-
nologies have been used in different ways in
specific time periods, which is another key issue
that microhistory could highlight. This kind of
analysis can also help us understand how man-
agers and other actors may go against prevailing
practices, break the rules of the game, or invent
new ones—thus highlighting their embedded
agency.
Third, interpretive history in general and
microhistory in particular can increase our un-
derstanding of the roles and identities of the
strategists and how they are adopted and
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constructed in different historical settings. In ad-
dition to highlighting the role of top managers,
such analysis can also help us comprehend the
actions of middle managers in different sociohis-
torical contexts and therefore add to the discussion
of the roles and identities of the strategists
(Mantere, 2008; Wooldridge et al., 2008). Further-
more, interpretive historical analysis can help us
betterunderstandhowprevailingpracticesenable
or impede engagement or participation of non-
managerial actors (Mantere & Vaara, 2008).
Poststructuralist History and Embeddedness of
Strategic Discourses
Ontoepistemological basis. Poststructuralist
history in general and genealogy in particular
can advance our understanding of the historical
embeddedness of strategic discourses, as well as
their truth and power effects. Poststructuralist
history focuses on the construction of historical
understanding that is then deconstructed in ana-
lyses that are often critical in spirit (Rowlinson &
Hassard, 2014). This approach can take different
forms, and it is pursued not only by historians but
also by philosophers and social scientists with
a poststructuralist orientation.
Ontoepistemologically, poststructuralist his-
tory is based on radical constructionism and is
closely connected to poststructuralism and post-
modernism in the social sciences (Flynn, 2005),
including organization studies (Hassard, 1994;
Hassard&Cox, 2013). In poststructuralism the key
notion is that of discourse, which is usually un-
derstood as the fundamental element in the
social construction of reality. Accordingly, post-
structuralism focuses on uncovering dominant
discourses and their implications for social re-
ality and especially power. Unlike historical re-
alism or interpretive history, poststructuralist
analysis problematizes and deconstructs pre-
vailing historical narratives (Durepos & Mills,
2012). This also means an emphasis on reflexivity
in terms of how researchers themselves portray
and present historical material and interpreta-
tions, resulting in ways of reporting that may be
characterized by criticality and irony.
Methodology.Methodologically, poststructuralist
history can take several forms. In business history,
Lipartito and Sicilia (2004) outlined a poststructur-
alist approach questioning the predominance of
economic perspectives that has led to a limited un-
derstanding of the corporation as a sociopolitical
actor. In a similar spirit, Rowlinson and Hassard
(2014) present deconstruction and narrative de-
construction and reconstruction as methods for cul-
turally oriented business history. Durepos andMills
(2012), in turn, call for historiography informed by
actor network theory.
In the following, we concentrate on genealogy
as a particularly fruitful methodology to analyze
the historical embeddedness of strategic dis-
courses and their power effects. Genealogy fo-
cuses on the historical evolution of concepts and
discourses, and it is mainly associated with Fou-
cauldian discourse analysis (Foucault, 1977).
However, genealogical discourse analysis may
also include other historically oriented forms of
critical discourse analysis or combinations
thereof (Anaı¨s, 2013; Wodak, 2001).2 Genealogy
includes theuseof historiographicalmethods, but
in a very specific manner. Central to this method
is the idea of “archaeology,” which Foucault ini-
tially developed in TheArchaeology of Knowledge
(1972) and The Order of Things (1973). In essence,
archaeology means historiographical analysis of
knowledge that is not based on the primacy of the
knowing subject but where knowledge in itself is
constructed in discourses. Although archaeology
helps us focus on and compare the discourses of
specific time periods, it does not as such explain
shifts from one period to another, for which pur-
pose Foucault developed his genealogical view
in the landmark book Discipline and Punish (1977).
The key idea in genealogy is that the discursive
and other practices as we observe them have
evolved over time in the course of history on the
basis of existing practices and their trans-
formations. In this view, discourses play a central
role in the social construction of reality; they
“systematically form the objects of which they
speak” (Foucault, 1972: 49). A key point in genea-
logical analysis is therefore examining the pre-
vailing discourses of specific time periods and
elaborating on their implications for subjectivity
and power (Foucault, 1994). Thus, although the
development of practices is path dependent, it
2 Genealogy originates from the philosophical work of
Nietzsche, from which Foucault (1994) drew his inspiration. At
times, Foucauldian discourse analysis and critical discourse
analysis, especially Fairclough’s (2003) critical discourse anal-
ysis, are seen as epistemologically distinct alternatives. How-
ever, like Anaı¨s (2013) or Wodak (2001), we argue that forms of
critical discourse analysis build on Foucault’s work and specif-
ically advance our empirical understanding of discursive phe-
nomena, such as interdiscursivity or recontextualization.
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also involves “accidentalities,” since new ideas
may emerge and transform prevailing practices,
often with far less deliberation or intentionality
than we tend to attribute to human and social
action (Poster, 1982). In all of this, critical reflection
on the dominant historical constructions and their
implications for the subjectivities of actors and
the power relations between them is essential. In
fact, Foucault (1994) provocatively saw genealogy
as “antihistory”when reflecting upon Nietzsche’s
contributions that problematized prevailing his-
torical constructions.
Genealogical methods have been used exten-
sively in different areas and disciplines, and this is
also the case with management and organization
studies (Hassard & Rowlinson, 2002; McKinlay &
Starkey, 1998). Foucauldian genealogy has been
applied in the critical stream of strategy and pro-
cess studies. In particular, Knights and Morgan’s
(1991) genealogical study tracks down the emer-
gence of strategic management discourse and
helps us understand how it developed in the post-
war era,mainly in theUnitedStates, and thereafter
gained ground globally. Economic growth and the
development ofmultinational corporations created
a need to manage increasingly complex organiza-
tions, and strategic discourse emerged as an an-
swer to this demand. This coincided with the
development of business schools, leading to the
emergence of strategic management as a disci-
pline and field of research. Not least because of the
promiseof control inherent in strategic discourse, it
has spread to all kinds of organizational and cul-
tural contexts.
The analysis of Knights and Morgan (1991)
helps us understand not only this development
but also its implications. In particular, their
analysis highlights the power effects of this dis-
course, which include the following:
(a) It provides managers with a rationalization of
their successes and failures; (b) It sustains and
enhances the prerogatives of management and
negates alternative perspectives on organizations;
(c) It generates a sense of security for managers; (d)
It reflects and sustains a strong sense of gendered
masculinity for male management; (e) It demon-
strates managerial rationality to colleagues, cus-
tomers, competitors, government and significant
others in the environment; (f) It facilitates and le-
gitimates theexerciseofpower; (g) It constitutes the
subjectivity of organizational members as partic-
ular categoriesof personswhosecure their senseof
reality through engaging in this discourse and
practice (Knights & Morgan, 1991: 262–263).
Others have followed this path and com-
plemented Knights and Morgan’s (1991) analysis.
For example, Kornberger (2013) provides an in-
sightful analysis of von Clausewitz’s work on
strategy and its power effects in a Foucauldian
spirit. This account focuses both on the initial text
and how it has been subsequently interpreted
among strategy scholars. This reveals quite dis-
tinctive ways in which proper strategizing and
being a strategist are constructed. Thomas et al.
(2013), in turn, provide a critical discursive anal-
ysis of the history of the academic discipline of
strategicmanagement. They examine theways in
which “histories” of this field construct what is
seen as “strategic” or relevant for strategic man-
agement. They maintain that central in these
representations is the tendency to reconstruct the
field as progressing in a teleological fashion and
to distinguish it from other fields in order to em-
phasize the importance of strategic management
over other forms of management or organizing.
Still others, such as Ezzamel andWillmott (2008,
2010), Rasche and Chia (2009), and Hardy and
Thomas (2014), have used Foucauldian discourse
analysis in studying organizational strategy-
making, although the genealogical historical as-
pects of their analyses have been less important
than their explicit reflections on the power effects
of strategic discourse in context. Thus, the poten-
tial of genealogical analysis has not been fully
realized in strategyprocess and practice research
(see also Allard-Poe´si, 2015).
Contribution: Historical embeddedness of
strategic discourses and their power effects. We
therefore argue that future research cango further
in poststructuralist analysis of strategic discourses
and their power effects and so contribute espe-
cially to critical analyses of strategic manage-
ment. First, although the studies mentioned
above have highlighted important aspects of the
historical evolution of strategic management,
Thomas et al. (2013), for example, have stated that
we have only begun to understand the historical
canonization and institutionalization of strategic
management as a discipline. We maintain that
the focus should be not only on what is explicitly
called “strategic management” but also on other
strategic discourses in other contexts. Thus, fu-
ture research should examine the dominant dis-
courses of specific historical contexts and periods
that have been given little attention when the fo-
cus has been on the Western conceptions of stra-
tegic planning or strategic management.
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Furthermore, future research can specifically
highlight thehistoricallyproduced interdiscursivity
of strategic management discourses—that is, how
discourses are interlinked in context (Vaara, 2010).
In addition to the linkage to postwar corporate
development—as highlighted by Knights and
Morgan (1991)—or its militaristic origins—as
explained by Kornberger (2013)—there are other
discursive aspects of contemporary strategic
management that deserve special attention. These
include its postcolonial and neocolonial aspects,
which have received little explicit recognition
(Prasad, 2003). For instance,wecanviewstrategic
discourse as part of a neocolonial globalization
project linkedwith Americanization (Djelic, 1998).
As Knights and Morgan (1991) showed in their ge-
nealogical analysis, the historically constructed
American influence is central in contemporary stra-
tegicmanagement discourses. Future research could
go further by elucidating how this is shown in dis-
courses about planning, participation, reporting, or
corporate governanceand variations andnuances in
these discourses. We therefore maintain that future
genealogical research can go beyond the classic
analysis of Knights andMorgan (1991) in elaborating
on the various interdiscursive aspects of strategic
management and their implications in different so-
ciohistorical contexts.
Second, genealogical analysis can also be ap-
plied to better understand the recontextualiza-
tions or translations of strategic discourses in
various sociohistorical contexts (see also Vaara,
2010). This is a key aspect of embeddedness that
has received little attention in previous research.
Careful discourse analysis can help us under-
stand, for example, how strategic management
has spread to public sector organizations, such as
universities, city organizations, hospitals, schools,
and kindergartens, and has been linked with spe-
cific traditions of bureaucracy or professionalism
in various sociohistorical settings. Specific inter-
discursive combinations and their tensions are
particularly interesting objects of study, both his-
torically and for comprehension of contemporary
power and ideological struggles.
Third, genealogical analysis can specifically
highlight the truth effects of strategic discourses—
or “strategic truths.”Thus, it canhelpusunderstand
the institutionalization of particular forms of
knowledge and dominant logics in them, as well
as fads and fashions in strategic management
(Abrahamson, 1991, 1996). This is not a trivialmatter
but, rather, a key aspect in the development of the
body of knowledge about strategic management—
with respect to what we regard as proper knowl-
edge. As shown by Thomas et al. (2013), such
analysis can span both academic and more
popular forms of knowledge, including critical
reflection on their ideological underpinnings and
power effects.
Fourth, genealogy is especially suitable for the
analysis of the subjectivities constructed for stra-
tegicactors (Knights&Morgan,1991),whichhelps to
advance our understanding of strategy as a pro-
fession. In a rare analysis of the evolution of the
strategy profession, Whittington et al. (2011) argue
that strategy is a “precarious profession” that is
subject to shifts in societal and organizational
power. These scholars maintain that this pre-
cariousness has increased over time, with more
open forms of strategy-making, transparency, and
inclusion gaining ground. On this basis, they call
for more research on this topic. Genealogical
analysis of thedevelopment of strategicdiscourses
can be seen as a particularly suitable method for
this purpose since it helps to elucidate how
prevailing discourses of strategy-making and
strategic management more generally construct
structures of rights and obligations for various
actors, thus defining and redefiningwho can be seen
as strategy professionals or who can be allowed to
engage instrategy-makingandonwhat terms.Apart
ofall of this ishowspecific companiesandmanagers
may emerge as exemplars and heroes to be followed
by others (Paroutis, Mckeown, & Collinson, 2013).
Fifth, and related to the previous point, genea-
logical analysis can help us better understand
various forms of engagement and participation in
organizational strategy-making (Mantere & Vaara,
2008). In addition to elaborating on the roles and
identities of various actors as discussed above in
thecaseofmicrohistory, genealogical analysis can
elucidate how specific actors may become strate-
gists in particular organizations—and how this
may be facilitated or impeded. In addition to high-
lighting the subjectivities and power relations of
top andmiddlemanagers, such analysis can focus
on nonmanagerial decisionmakers and can add to
our knowledge of the various forms and dynamics
of engagement, participation, and resistance
(Ezzamel & Willmott, 2008, 2010). Genealogical
analysis, for instance, allows us to see resistance
as a productive force, which is an issue that has
received very little attention in prior research.
This is the case although, for example, creative
dialogue may require alternative viewpoints or
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autonomous strategy-making resistance to pre-
vailing strategies (Dick & Collings, 2014; Laine &
Vaara, 2007). Genealogical studies could elabo-
rate on themultipleways inwhichparticipation is
discursively constructed in various sociohistori-
cally embedded discourses, thus extending the
research agenda in strategy-making.
Sixth and finally, Foucauldian genealogical
analysis is often seen as “merely” textual analy-
sis that does not connect with material reality.
This, however, is a misunderstanding, since in
this method the discursive practices may be
closely linked with sociomaterial practices. This
is clear in Foucault’s original work and, for in-
stance, in CDA-type discourse analysis (Vaara,
2010). Thus, genealogical analysis can also ex-
tend our understanding of how strategy tools and
other sociomaterial practices have shaped
strategy-making over time (Dameron et al., 2015;
Jarzabkowski & Kaplan, 2015; Wright, Paroutis, &
Blettner, 2013). While the current literature on
sociomateriality has already helped us un-
derstand how specific tools may enable or con-
strain human actors, genealogical analysis can
add to this knowledge by illuminating the role of
strategy tools in strategic discourses. For in-
stance, it is important to examine how specific
strategy tools have been developed, used, and
become institutionalized in different sociohistor-
ical contexts. It would also be interesting to study
theways inwhich the tools themselves have been
key parts in constituting strategic truths and
fashions or in shaping the evolution of the strat-
egy profession. For example, five-year planning,
the BCG matrix, and Porter’s five forces have un-
doubtedly hadacrucial role in thedevelopment of
strategic management as a field and profession.
Moreover, “open strategy” or the “massification”
of strategy (Whittington, 2015; Whittington et al.,
2011) would not have been possible without tech-
nologies enabling widespread information gath-
ering and participation.
HISTORICAL EMBEDDEDNESS AS A BASIS FOR
HISTORICALLY INFORMED STRATEGY
PROCESS AND PRACTICE RESEARCH
The three approaches and the associated
methods reviewed above explain how historical
analysis can advance our understanding of his-
torical embeddedness in strategy process and
practice research. In the following we discuss the
need for methodological alternatives and for
taking their ontoepistemological commitments
seriously, elaborate on key aspects of historical
embeddedness and their implications for theory
development in strategy process and practice
studies, and, finally, reflect on the application of
historical methods with an example.
Methodological Alternatives and
Ontoepistemological Commitments
We have presented realist history, interpretive
history, and poststructuralist history as distinctive
approaches and have offered specific methods to
uncover aspects of historical embeddedness. We
underscore that these approaches are based on
fundamentally different ontological assumptions
and epistemological commitments that reflect dif-
ferentparadigmsinmanagementandorganization
research (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Hassard & Cox,
2013; Newton et al., 2011; Tsoukas & Chia, 2011).
These three approaches by and large cohere with
those in Hassard and Cox’s (2013) recent paradigm
model based on Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) initial
work. Like them, we emphasize the importance of
making analytical distinctions between traditions
when developing theorizations of processes, prac-
tices, and discourses in historical context—even if
they can inform each other or might even be com-
bined in specific studies (Hassard, 1991). Thus, the
three historical approaches that we elaborate on
should not merely be seen as part of a toolkit of
historical methods without consideration of what
they stand for.
More specifically, these approaches reflect fun-
damentally different assumptions about key as-
pects of historical analysis (Kipping & U¨sdiken,
2014; Rowlinson et al., 2014; Wadhwani & Bucheli,
2014), of which truth, temporality, and narrative
representation are central for our purposes. In re-
alist history the intention is to present strategic
processes and events as accurately and authenti-
cally as possibleand touncover underlying causal
mechanisms. In interpretive history the focus is on
the reconstruction and reenactment of strategy-
makingandassociatedcontextualpractices insitu.
In contrast, the objective inpoststructuralist history
is to problematize historical truths about strategic
management and to focus on their implications
(Kuukkanen, 2015). In fact, poststructuralist history
may be used to criticize conventional realist his-
torical analysis.
As for temporality, realist historians see time
primarily as chronological since the focus is on
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dynamic strategic processes and their causal
mechanisms; the time horizon is usually rela-
tively long, especially in comparative historical
analysis. Interpretive historians concentrate on
time in situ and the construction of meaning for
the actors involved in strategy-making; this may
involve constructions of the past, present, and fu-
ture as part of the strategy-making of the moment
in historical context. Poststructuralist historians,
in turn, focus on spatiotemporal reconstructions
and deconstructions where the present implica-
tions can only be understood by unraveling the
historical evolution of the strategic discourses
(Jordheim, 2014).
As for historical narratives, realist history usu-
ally involves representation that aims at gener-
alizations in terms of temporal causal patterns,
interpretive history at reenactment of past actions
and practices in situ, and poststructuralism at
critical deconstruction of such narratives (see
also Vaara, Sonenshein, & Boje, 2016). The narra-
tive representations in each of these approaches
may thus look very different, which should also be
reflected in the writing of these historical ana-
lyses (Kuukkanen, 2012; Zagorin, 1999). In all,
elucidating these differences is important be-
cause it helps to specify the alternative ways of
conducting historically informed strategyprocess
and practice research—as has recently been
called for in management history more generally
(Bucheli & Wadhwani, 2014; De Jong & Higgins,
2015; Rowlinson et al., 2014).
Facets of Historical Embeddedness and
Implications for Theory Building
We have argued that historical embeddedness
involves three facets that can be analyzed and
understood with specific historical approaches
and methods: the historical embeddedness of
strategic processes, strategic practices, and stra-
tegic discourses. In the spirit of the special topic
forum, we have highlighted particular intersec-
tions of historical approaches and streams of
strategy process and practice studies. As elabo-
rated in the previous sections, this analysis of
historical embeddedness helps provide new an-
swers to existing research questions and poses
new ones. In particular, it adds to our under-
standing of at least three fundamental issues in
strategic management: forms of strategic pro-
cesses and practices, construction of organiza-
tional strategies, and strategic agency.
First and foremost, analysis of historical
embeddedness advances our understanding of
how forms of strategic processes and practices
differ across sociohistorical settings, aswell as our
understanding of their implications for strategy-
making. Overall, a historical perspective can
broaden the scope of strategy process and prac-
tice research; what is “strategic” does not have to
be limited to what is nowadays explicitly called
strategic and can encompass various kinds of
strategic processes and practices. Furthermore,
historical analysis helps open up the time hori-
zon; it is not only the contemporary cases and
phenomena that deserve scholarly attention but
also those that took place earlier or even in the
distant past. Examining the embeddedness of
strategic processes highlights the close connec-
tion between organizational strategy-making
and broader historical conditions and industrial
and technological changes. Here comparative
historical analysis can play a major role in uncov-
ering long-term processes, as well as in explicitly
comparing cases. Analysis of the embeddedness
of strategic practices can, in turn, elucidate the
historical specificity of key practices in different
social, cultural, and sociopolitical settings—
including practices that may not be perceived as
strategic—as highlighted by microhistory. A fo-
cus on the historical embeddedness of strategic
discourses, in turn, contributes to our understand-
ing of the various ways prevailing societal dis-
courses or zeitgeist allows for specific forms of
strategy-making to develop and, at times, change,
with implications for the development of the field
and profession (Whittington et al., 2011).
Second, analysis of historical embeddedness
adds to our understanding of the construction of
organizational strategies or their emergence in
context. Emergence is a key issue in strategic pro-
cess research (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Mirabeau
& Maguire, 2013), and analysis of the embedded-
ness of strategic processes can add to existing
research by showing how strategies emerge in
and through historical processes. Analysis of the
embeddedness of strategic practices can, in turn,
explain how specific strategies are constructed
in situ in relation to various practices that enable
orconstrainstrategy-making (Vaara&Whittington,
2012). Finally, analysis of the embeddedness of
historical discourses highlights how conceptions
of strategies and strategy-making are repro-
duced and transformed over time, aswell as their
implications.
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Third, agency is a key issue in social studies
more generally, but we focus here on strategic
agency—that is, the ability of managers or other
organizational actors to influence the strategic
processes or trajectories of an organization. Con-
ventionally, strategy research has treated this
question almost as a nonissue, since strategic
managers have been viewed as actors that can
and should control organizations via strategic
decisionmaking.Research on strategic processes
and practices has, however, provided an un-
derstanding of how this agency is enabled or
constrainedby theprevailing context (Floyd et al.,
2011; Vaara & Whittington, 2012). The historical
analysiswe call for adds to this understanding by
highlighting how strategic agency is conditioned
by historically embedded processes and how
historically embedded practices enable or con-
strain this agency in a given historical period or
point in time. Furthermore, analysis of the his-
torically embedded discourses contributes to our
understanding of the subject positions that are
constructed for managers and other actors
(Knights &Morgan, 1991), and future research can
go further in elucidating how conceptions of
“strategists” are constructed in a particular so-
ciohistorical setting andwhat these constructions
imply for issues such as participation in or re-
sistance to strategy-making.
Application of Historical Methods
Theseapproaches involve specificmethods,and
we have highlighted those with the potential to
uncover particular facets of historical embedded-
ness. While in strategy process studies re-
searchers have already made use of naturalistic
historical case studies, we offer comparative his-
torical analysis as a method for going further into
the historically embedded processes and causal
mechanisms involved. Although strategy practice
researchers have frequently used interpretive
case studies and ethnographic methods (Samra-
Fredericks, 2003, 2015), historical analyses have
been rare (Ericson et al., 2015; Whittington et al.,
2011). We have suggested microhistory as a par-
ticularly fruitful method not least because micro-
history is close to historical ethnography
(Rowlinson et al., 2014) and, thus, appears as the
natural extension of ethnographically oriented
strategy-as-practice research (Jarzabkowski,
Bednarek & Spee, 2014; Vesa & Vaara, 2014).
Scholars have already used methods such as
genealogy in critical analyses of strategic pro-
cesses and practices (Knights & Morgan, 1991),
but we have offered ideas for taking such ana-
lyses further in order to highlight how strategic
phenomena are discursively constructed and to
explain their implications both at the field and
organizational levels.
Thus, we call for specific applications of his-
torical analysis depending on the research con-
text and questions at hand. It is also important to
note that the typical research designs and the
ways of analyzing historical data may differ sig-
nificantly. For comparative historical analysis,
longitudinal case comparisons are usually a key
part of the research design. For microhistory, the
focus is usually on specific cases and episodes in
them. Genealogy can then be used to analyze
discursive phenomena at the field level or across
cases, but it may also be applied to examine in-
dividual cases.
Each of thesemethods can therefore highlight
particular aspects of strategy-making in his-
torical context. Burgelman’s (1983, 1994, 2002a,b)
research on Intel, which we referred to in the
previous sections, serves as an illuminative
example. Although a great deal is already known
about strategy-making in Intel, historical anal-
ysis can significantly add to our understanding
of the embeddedness of strategic processes and
practices. As for realist history, Burgelman’s
(1983, 2002b) work already provides insights into
the processes and mechanisms of strategy-
making, in particular highlighting how the
strategic processes under Andy Grove (“micro-
processor company,” “vector model”) differed
from those of the previous period (“memory com-
pany,” ”ecological model”). However, a compar-
ative historical analysis could juxtapose Intel’s
case with other companies in the United States,
Japan, or Taiwan in both eras and could specifi-
cally highlight how Intel’s decisions differed from
those of its direct or indirect competitors (see,
for example, Wu, Hung, & Lin, 2006). This would
elucidate the strategic nature of specific de-
cisions, as well as provide possibilities for con-
trastingcounterfactualscenarios—that is, reflecting
on what Intel’s development could have been with-
out specific key decisions, such as investing in mi-
croprocessors or in RISC technology, or delays in
moving into networks. It is through such compara-
tive historical contextualization that we can also
better understand the strategic agency of such
keymanagers asMoore or Grove at such turning
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points—in contrast to strategic actions in other
contexts and eras.
Microhistory would then be able to “dig deep”
into the strategic actions and practices of
strategy-making in situ. While Burgelman’s work
has provided us with a detailed understanding of
the dynamics of strategy-making, we know less
about episodes of strategy-making in their his-
torical context. Burgelman’s book (2002b) does of-
fer some insights intoAndyGrove’s character and
style, but top management’s activities and prac-
tices are not described and analyzed in situ. Yet it
is important to understand how the top managers
met, what tools and frameworks they used, and
how they involved or did not involve others—and
how this changed in Intel over time. In addition, it
would be interesting to learn more about the
practices of uppermiddlemanagersandhow they
approached strategy-making, especially given
their key role in autonomous strategy-making,
which eventually turned Intel into a microproces-
sor corporation. As discussed above, such micro-
historical analysis can concentrate on important
events, even turning points, but it can also focus
on the more “mundane” strategy work. The latter
may be especially useful in bettering our un-
derstanding of the crucial role of middle man-
agers in Intel’s history. Like historical analysis
more generally, historical study of this kind
should place activities and practices in their so-
ciohistorical context. For instance, it seems that
the strategy-making practices of Intel reflect what
has been characteristic of high-tech companies in
Silicon Valley and the prevailing financial and
other control practices and popular ways of or-
ganizing strategywork in American corporations.
A closer look into Intel also suggests that the
ability to act as strategists was closely related to
technological competence on the one hand and
the ability to master strategic planning practices
on the other. The Intel case appears to tell us that
the former skills were more important in the first
part of the company’s history, whereas the latter
skills became more accentuated later on. It is
through such historical analysis that we can also
better understand the roles and identities of the
key managers as well as their agency in terms of
being enabled and constrained by the context-
specific practices.
Finally, genealogy can help us understand yet
other aspects of Intel’s strategy-making. In gen-
eral, the way strategies have been made sense of
at Intel is related to the dominant discourses. One
of the key questions concerns to what extent
Intel’s case—and the way it is narrated—relates
to dominant strategic truths or fashions. Like that
of many companies, Intel’s strategy-making ap-
parently reflects the key wisdoms or zeitgeist of
specific time periods. Intel also served as an ex-
ample for others since its top managers (espe-
cially Grove in the 1990s) received great media
attention, not unlike Bill Gates or Steve Jobs later
on. Thus, poststructuralist analysis helps us
understand how Intel’s case is part of more pop-
ular as well as academic discourses construct-
ing the strategy profession. In addition to the
heroification of top managers, it illuminates how
andunderwhat terms otherswere able to emerge
as key strategists. It is interesting to note that
the actions of middle managers as strategists
were widely approved and recognized only after
they had successfully paved the way for the
strategic reorientation of Intel and had been le-
gitimated in Grove’s period. A closer look at Intel
could also help us better understand seem-
ingly counterintuitive phenomena, such as how
middle management’s resistance contributed to
strategy-making—as it did in terms of “autono-
mous” strategy work. Finally, genealogical anal-
ysis of Intel—as in many other cases—may also
explicitly criticize prevailing ways of making
sense of strategy-making, including elements
such as Western ethnocentrism, financial preoc-
cupation, gendered orientation, or accentuated
individualism.
CONCLUSION
In this article we have presented three histori-
cal approaches that can be pursued to deepen our
understanding of the historical embeddedness of
strategic processes and practices: realist history,
interpretive history, and poststructuralist history.
In the spirit of the special topic forum, we have
thus provided ideas and suggestions for a “crea-
tive synthesis” of strategy process and practice
research and historical analysis. Like Kipping
and U¨sdiken (2014) and Rowlinson et al. (2014), we
maintain that it is important not to view history as
amere temporal variable or historical analysis as
the sheer use of archival data. Instead, we have
highlighted the potential of alternative forms of
historical analysis to further develop our theo-
retical understanding of the historical embed-
dedness of strategic processes and practices and
our conceptions of them.
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By offering a multifaceted view of historical
embeddedness, our analysis contributes to theory
building in strategy process and practice re-
search (Floyd et al., 2011; Hutzschenreuter &
Kleindienst, 2006; Vaara & Whittington, 2012). In
particular, we have pointed to specific intersec-
tions of historical approaches and strategy pro-
cess and practice research. Realist history in
general and comparative historical analysis in
particular can elucidate our understanding of the
historical embeddedness of strategic processes,
including historical conditions as triggers and
determinants of strategic processes, historical
mechanismsand causality in strategic processes,
and comparison of patterns and characteristics
of strategic processes across historical con-
texts, thus contributing especially to our under-
standing of context in strategy process research
(Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006; Pettigrew,
1987). Interpretive history in general and micro-
history in particular can add to our knowledge of
the historical embeddedness of strategic prac-
tices, involving the historical nature and con-
struction of strategic practices and the enactment
of strategic practices in historical contexts, con-
tributing specifically to strategy-as-practice re-
search, which has lacked an understanding of
historical embeddedness (Ericson et al., 2015;
Whittington et al., 2011). Poststructuralist history
in general and genealogy in particular can, in
turn, contribute to our understanding of the his-
torical embeddedness of strategic discourses by
dealing with such questions as the historical
production of strategic truths and fashions and
the historical construction of subject positions,
thus advancing especially critical research on
strategic management (Ezzamel &Willmott, 2010;
Knights&Morgan, 1991; Thomaset al., 2013). Inall,
these approaches and methods, in their specific
ways, shed light on key issues, such as the forms
of strategic processes and practices across so-
ciohistorical contexts, the historical construction
of organizational strategies, and historically con-
stituted strategic agency.
We maintain that by doing so our analysis can
also advance historically informed strategic
management research more generally. Although
researchonstrategicmanagement included, from
its inception, historical analyses (Chandler, 1962,
1977), the historical connection was at least par-
tially lost when strategic management research
developed into a separate discipline (Ericson
et al., 2015; Kahl et al., 2012, Thomas et al., 2013).
Thus, strategy scholars across the field have
called for an integration of historicalmethodsand
theories into contemporary research on strategic
management (Ingram et al., 2012; Kahl et al., 2012;
Whittington et al., 2011). By focusing on the key
issue of historical embeddedness in strategy pro-
cess and practice research, we have elucidated the
importance and usefulness of historical analysis
and, thus, attempted to respond in part to this call.
We also maintain that the points about historical
embeddedness may, with due caution, benefit
other areas of strategic management, even process
and practice-basedmanagement and organization
studies more generally. For instance, the resource-
based view (Priem & Butler, 2001) or research on
dynamic capabilities (Augier & Teece, 2006)may be
enriched by analysis of the historical embedded-
ness of resources or capabilities. Research on stra-
tegic and organizational change can benefit from
a deeper understanding of historical embedded-
ness in termsof theprocessdynamicsandcausality
in them (Jacobides, 2005; Teece, Pisano & Shuen,
1997), including topics such as path dependency
(Schreyogg& Sydow, 2011). Such analysismay also
informnewformsofprocessanalysis (Langleyetal.,
2013). Finally, analysis of the historical embedded-
ness of strategic discoursesmight also be extended
to other topics and areas.
Our analysis can also help advance historical
research, especially business history. Scholars
have recently called for more integration of busi-
ness history with management research (Bucheli
& Wadhwani, 2014; Kipping & U¨sdiken, 2014;
Leblebici, 2014; O’Sullivan & Graham, 2010;
Rowlinson et al., 2014), and we have attempted to
do just that in the case of strategy process and
practice research. Following the example of
others (Rowlinson et al., 2014), we have under-
scored that this should involve a historiographi-
cal understanding of the ontoepistemological
basis of different historical approaches. Business
historians have argued for the need to develop
new methods (De Jong & Higgins, 2015; Jones &
Zeitlin, 2008; Wadhwani & Bucheli, 2014). In this
spirit, we have pointed to the potential of largely
underutilized methods, such as comparative his-
torical analysis, microhistory, and genealogy.
Finally, this analysis has limitations that war-
rant attention. Although our analysis indicates
a specific resonance between realist history and
strategy process research, interpretive history
and strategy-as-practice studies, and poststruc-
turalist history andacritical analysis of strategic
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phenomena and knowledge, these approaches
and methods can also be applied at other in-
tersections. For instance, realist comparative
analysis may benefit strategy-as-practice re-
search, microhistory combined with poststruc-
turalist analysis, or genealogy used to elucidate
the historical embeddedness of strategic prac-
tices. With due caution, these epistemologically
different approaches might even be combined
(Hassard, 1991). We have focused on specific
historical approaches and methods, but there
are many others that strategy scholars can ben-
efit from (see, for example, Jones & Zeitlin, 2008,
and O’Sullivan & Graham, 2010). Strategy
scholars can also otherwise learn from historical
analysis and historiographical reflection. This is
especially the case with source criticism—that
is, a critical perspective on any specific source of
evidence—and authenticity—that is, an effort to
place cases, facts, and findings as much as
possible in their original historical context.
There are also new opportunities for historical
analysis that are linkedwith the digitalization of
archives and web-based analysis methods.
These trends make historical data more acces-
sible and, thus, are likely to support historically
informed strategy research. In all, we have ar-
gued for taking historical embeddedness seri-
ously in strategy process and practice research
and hope that this analysis can also inspire
historically oriented strategic management re-
search more generally.
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